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1.  Introduction 
 
Most contemporary liberal theories of justice agree that 
principles of justice should be neutral between citizens’ 
conceptions of the good life. Liberals are committed to the 
claim that government should treat citizens with equal 
concern and respect; and, it is claimed, treating citizens with 
equal concern and respect requires not taking sides in favour 
of any one of them, as regards the conceptions of the good 
life they endorse (DWORKIN 1978a). 
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Liberal neutrality has been the object of serious criticism. 
Objections raised against the original formulations of the doc-
trine of neutrality have prompted the shift towards forms of so 
called ‘political’ liberalism (RAWLS 1985; Larmore 1990). In 
contemporary pluralistic societies, claims to the effect that 
autonomy and individuality are paramount ethical values 
sound themselves sectarian. Liberal neutrality, in so far as it is 
envisaged as entailed by these values, cannot be expected to 
be widely agreed upon. In order to avoid being one sectarian 
doctrine among others, liberalism, it is argued, should apply 
the principle of toleration to philosophy itself. This way, 
liberal principles of justice may be recast as the core of an 
overlapping consensus between different and partially 
conflicting ethical, religious, or philosophical doctrines held 
by different groups or individuals in society (RAWLS 1993). 
Political liberalism implies, I think, that in its original versions 
the doctrine of neutrality is too naïve, or simply wrong. Its 
main tenets should be understood, I submit, as an attempt at 
reformulating, and improving, the received doctrine.  
Not all liberal theorists have endorsed the shift towards 
political liberalism. Among liberal philosophers who reject 
the claims of political liberalism, some simply reject the 
doctrine of neutrality (e.g., J. Raz). Others hang on to the 
doctrine in its – more or less amended, as the case may be – 
original form.  
My aim is not to provide a reconstruction of the main 
steps in this debate, nor an assessment of the main 
arguments for and against liberal neutrality. I simply record 
that the debate about whether principles of justice can and 
should be neutral between the different conceptions of the 
good held in society is still a lively one. In retrospect, the 
distance between the doctrine of neutrality in its original 
formulations, on the one hand, and political liberalism, on 
the other hand, may appear less dramatic that it might have 
seemed at first sight.  
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In what follows, I will assume – no argument will be 
provided supporting this assumption – that the liberal doctrine 
of state neutrality can somehow be defended against its 
critics. Of course, its defense requires some caution. So, for 
instance, liberal neutrality must be understood as “limited in 
scope” (KYMLICKA 2002, 218), and as “a matter of degree” 
(GOODIN, REEVE 1989, 7). Crucially, the quest for a morally 
neutral justification of neutrality – prompted by concern that 
“nonneutral justifications of neutrality betray the ideal” 
(WALL, KLOSKO 2003, 4) – is misguided; there is no such a 
thing (the very notion is incoherent). But, I assume, once our 
theoretical ambitions are cut down to reasonable size, defen-
ding neutrality is not an impossible task
1
. (According to W. 
Kymlicka, it is even possible to provide a satisfactory defense 
of the stronger principle of the state’s ‘benign neglect’ of 
religious doctrines, and at least some conceptions of the good 
life
2
). My first aim is to show that a certain connection holds 
between liberal neutrality, suitably understood, on the one 
hand, and, on the other hand, the Rule of Law. 
By the ‘Rule of Law’ (henceforth RoL, for short) I mean, 
as has now become usual among legal theorists, a set of 
 
 
1  Which doesn’t mean, of course, that it is an easy task. Cf. e.g. 
KYMLICKA 1989b, 899-905; ID. 2002, 251, 265-6. 
2  That, according to Kymlicka, ‘benign neglect’ is an incoherent 
notion in the case of culture and language (1995, 108, 110-1, 113) 
does not contradict this. Precisely under this respect, the case of 
religious doctrines is not analogous to language and culture (ibid., 
111; KYMLICKA 2002, 344-5). KYMLICKA (2002, 344) distinguishes 
between a weaker principle of neutrality (that leaves it open the 
possibility that a given conception of the good life is promoted on 
grounds different from its alleged intrinsic superiority over other 
views) and a stronger principle of the state’s ‘benign neglect’ of 
(some) differences. As far as religious views are concerned, 
liberalism, he claims, can afford endorsing both principles.  
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formal and institutional features the law may possess in 
varying degrees. These features define an ideal, which laws 
have traditionally been expected to live up to. It is, under 
many respects, a modest ideal. Specifically, the RoL, by 
itself, does not guarantee liberal neutrality. But, I shall 
argue, there is something neutral about it. More precisely. a 
specific version of the RoL requirements – I shall call this 
‘Enlightenment Rule of Law’ (ERoL, for short) – 
illuminatingly instantiates part of what is involved in the 
idea of liberal neutrality. This, as we shall see, concerns the 
form, not the content, of the law. 
My first aim, then, is to show that the RoL – specifically, 
ERoL – realizes one important aspect of liberal neutrality
3
. I 
will show, secondly, that the RoL is part and parcel of what 
is involved in liberal multiculturalism.  
I use the label ‘liberal multiculturalism’ (LM, for short) in 
the sense developed by W. Kymlicka. So understood, it 
designates a loose set of policies, and the principles 
supporting them, designed to acknowledge and accomodate 
ethnocultural minorities, and to secure to individuals the good 
of cultural membership. (I will not say nuch about which 
policies and principles these are; the reader is referred to 
Kymlicka’a work.) There is one simple argument for showing 
that the RoL is part and parcel of what is involved in LM, of 
course. If LM is a form of liberalism, if liberalism entails the 
principle of state neutrality, and if state neutrality entails the 
RoL (or ERol), then LM entails the RoL. This argument is 
not, however, very illuminating. I shall put forward a different 
argument. Laws that fully meet the requirements of the RoL 
may certainly run counter human rights. Conformity to the 
 
 
3  Some conceptual kinship between discussions of the RoL in 
jurisprudential circles and contemporary talk of liberal neutrality is 
noted in GOODIN, REEVE 1989, 8. 
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RoL – specifically, ERoL – however, is a necessary condition 
for respecting human rights. Respect for human rights, in turn, 
is required by LM. Thus, respect for ERoL is a necessary 
condition of LM. And, if ERoL expresses part of what is 
involved in the ideal of liberal neutrality, so too LM may be 
understood accordingly. 
I shall proceed as follows. After briefly explaining what I 
mean by the ‘Rule of Law’ (s. 2), ERoL will be introduced, as 
a particular version of traditional RoL doctrine, and the 
connections between ERoL and liberal neutrality will be 
explored (sections 3 and 4). Then, coming to LM, I will set up 
the required premises about, first, LM and human rights; and, 
second, about human rights and the RoL (s. 5). From these 
premises my announced conclusion about LM, liberal 
neutrality, and the RoL will follow (s. 6) – or so I hope. 
 
  
2.  The rule of law 
 
There are many different ways of understanding the phrase 
‘the Rule of Law’
4
. Here I adopt the one which has become 
common in contemporary jurisprudence in the last forty years 
or so
5
. Accordingly, by ‘the Rule of Law’ I understand a loose 
cluster of (1) formal features of the laws (prospectivity, 
 
 
4  For a survey cf. WALDRON 2002, 155-7; ID. 2004, 319-20; BEN-
NETT 2007, 92-4. According to some (including WALDRON; see 2002, 
157-9), the concept of the RoL is an “essentially contested concept”, 
in W.B. Gallie’s sense. This claim will not be discussed here.  
5  Accounts in this family have the form of “a sort of laundry list of 
features that a healthy legal system should have. These are mostly varia-
tions of the eight desiderata of Lon Fuller’s ‘internal morality of law’” 
(WALDRON 2002, 154). Cf. ibid., 154-5, for a survey of the main ac-
counts in this vein (L.L. FULLER, J. RAZ, J. FINNIS, J. RAWLS, M. RADIN). 
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publicity, relative generality, relative stability, intelligibility 
and relative clarity, practicability
6
, consistency), plus (2) 
institutional and procedural desiderata (such as, for instance, 
that the making of individual norms applying to individual 
cases be guided by general rules; and, further, so-called 
principles of ‘natural justice’: that the resolution of disputes 
be entrusted to somebody not having an interest at stake in the 
judgment, and not being otherwise biased; the principle audi 
alteram partem, and so on)
7
. Items on the list partly vary 
according to the accounts given by different authors. The 
core, however, is stable
8
. My concern in what follows will be 
only with the features belonging to the first group (‘formal’ 
requirements) – in fact, when talking of ERoL (below, 3 and 
4), only some of them. 
Some of these are features that the law may possess in 
varying degrees. Most of them specify, more or less directly, 
what is instrumentally required in order to achieve an end – 
 
 
6  I.e., conformity to the principle ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. 
7  For a list of these institutional and procedural requirements see e.g. 
RAZ 1977, 215-8 (“the making of particular laws (particular legal orders) 
should be guided by open, stable, clear, and general rules”; “the 
independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed”; “the courts should 
have review powers over the implementation of the other principles”; “the 
courts should be easily accessible”; “the discretion of the crime-preventing 
agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law”). On principles of 
natural justice cf. HART, 1961, 156, 202. For similar lists of the RoL 
requirements see FULLER 1969, ch. 2, FINNIS 1980, 270-1; MARMOR 2004, 
5 ff. For sorting out principles constituting the RoL in formal and 
procedural ones see Waldron 2008a (but cf. also RAZ 1977, 218).  
8  As noted by WALDRON (2002, 155), the accounts given by these 
authors (Fuller, Finnis, Raz, Rawls, Radin) – their partly differing 
“laundry lists” – “seem quite congenial to each other; they are filling 
in the details of what is more or less the same conception in slightly 
different ways”. 
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namely, the end of guiding human behaviour through rules
9
. 
In other words, they are features the laws must possess if 
they are to be capable of being followed and obeyed
10
. So 
understood, the features constituting the RoL are features an 
instrument (laws) must possess in order to perform its 
function (guiding human behaviour) well – they are 
analogous to the good-making properties entailed by the 
meaning of any functional term. RoL requirements are 
analogous to the sharpness of a knife (RAZ 1977, 225; cf. 
nalso MARMOR 2004, 7).  
RoL features define an ethico-political ideal, which laws 
are usually expected to live up to
11
. But, I emphasize this, 
this view of the RoL has nothing to do with ideologically-
driven views, widely spread in contemporary (non-
jurisprudential) literature, that oppose the RoL to social and 
economic legislation, which – it is complained – “inter-
fere[s] with market processes, limit[s] property rights, or 
make[s] investment in the society more precarious or in 
other ways less remunerative”
12
. Such conceptions of the 
RoL I take as spurious
13
. I side with traditional, formal cum 
institutional and procedural, understandings of the RoL.  
 
 
9  In L.L. Fuller’s phrase, “the enterprise of subjecting human 
conduct to the governance of rules” (1969, 106).  
10  According to RAZ (1977, 214) the “basic idea” underlying RoL 
requirements (“the basic intuition from which the doctrine of the rule of 
law derives”) is “that the law must be capable of guiding the behaviour of 
its subjects” (“if the law is to be obeyed it must be capable of guiding the 
behaviour of its subjects. It must be such that they can find out what it is 
and act on it”, ibid., my emphasis). Cf. also MARMOR 2004, 5. 
11  The much debated question whether the features constituting the 
RoL are part of the very concept law I simply leave aside here. Cf. e.g. 
BENNETT 2007; WALDRON 2008a; ID. 2008b. 
12  I draw this characterization from WALDRON 2007, 92. 
13  Cf. generally WALDRON 2007.  
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3.  Enlightenment rule of law 
 
Not only the view of the RoL adopted here is in no way 
opposed to social and economic legislation. Also, it is no 
way opposed to legislation, as such. 
In what follows, I shall focus on a particular version of 
the ideal of the RoL. Its building blocks have been 
developed, very roughly, in European legal culture in the 
18th and 19th centuries; it is is associated, inter alia, with J. 
Bentham’s understanding of the formal features laws should 
possess. In this understanding, what is central to the RoL is 
the activity of legislating – i.e., of issuing prescriptions.  
Prescribing, as a kind of purposive human activity (roughly, 
trying to make people do something by telling them to do it), 
and prescriptive relationships (i.e., the kind of relationship 
which comes into being, by virtue of the happy issuing of a 
prescription, between a prescriber, or lawgiver in a wide sense, 
on the one hand, and those to whom her prescriptions are 
addressed, on the other hand) have many formal features. As 
with any other purposive, goal-oriented activity (and functional 
terms generally) some of these features express the requi-
rements that the activity has to meet, in order to achieve – and 
to achieve well – its constitutive purpose. Some of these 
features aptly instantiate elements of the RoL ideal. So, for 
instance, prescribing is a procedure openly and publicly 
directed at the issuing of public directives
14
. And, as we have 
seen, publicity of the relevant standards of behaviour is one of 
the requirements of the RoL. Thus, where prescriptions are 
involved, not only the standard itself, but also its mode of birth, 
are laid out in the open
15
. Further, prescriptions typically have 
 
 
14  For a detailed discussion of this point see below, s. 4. 
15  Cf. WALDRON 2007, 99: the legislature “is an institution set up 
explicitly to make and change the law. (…) Law-making by courts is not a 
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to be prospective, and intelligible; if they are to be capable of 
achieving their purpose (i.e., guiding human behaviour), they 
have to be laid out in advance, and clear enough for the 
addressee to understand them (cf. MARMOR 2004, 19-20, 26-7). 
And the activity of prescribing is subject to rational pressure in 
favour of conformity to the principle ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, and 
the avoidance of conflicts (so called ‘antinomies’)
16
. The latter, 
too, are, as we have seen (above, 2), among the requirements of 
the RoL – respectively, practicability, and consistency.  
This legislative twist to the RoL should not be 
surprising. After all, most of the requirements of the RoL 
follow, as I have remarked, from what is instrumentally 
 
 
transparent process; law-making in a legislature by contrast is law-making 
through a procedure dedicated publicly and transparently to that task” (the 
“transparency” of legislation). See also WALDRON 2009, 693. 
16  These are all features that prescriptions typically exhibit, and 
pressures prescriptions are standardly subject to. The possibility of 
non-standard prescriptions is not ruled out (below, n. 42). These will 
be cases of abuse of the institution of prescribing. So, for instance, 
one assumption which makes possible the issuing of prescriptions, and 
the coming into existence of prescriptive relationships, is that the 
prescriber wants the addressee to do what she tells him to do (VON 
WRIGHT 1963, 7, 119; ID., 1983, I, 8; CELANO 1990, 127). This is a 
defeasible presumption. It is, however, standardly true; and an explicit 
denial of this condition would prevent a prescription from coming into 
being (‘I hereby order you to do A, but I don’t care whether you do it 
or not’; cf. SEARLE 1969, 60, 64 ff.). In the light of this presumption, 
the principle ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ applies to prescriptions (so, e.g., a 
prescription enjoining an action explicitly acknowledged to be 
physically impossible would sound odd). Likewise, purported logical 
relations between prescriptions may be interpreted, via the assumption 
that whoever prescribes somebody to do something wants the 
addressee to do it, as criteria of a rational lawgiving will (VON WRIGHT 
1983; BOBBIO 1971; CELANO 1990, 268-82). 
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required when we want to subject human behaviour to the 
guidance of rules (‘subjecting human conduct to the 
governance of rules’; above, 2). And, of course, prescribing 
just is, in a straightforward sense, trying to subject human 
behaviour to the guidance of rules (trying to make 
somebody do something by telling them to do it)
17
. True, 
prescribing is not necessarily the issuing of general 
directives, or of ‘rules’ proper. Under this, and perhaps 
other, respects the requirements of the RoL do not apply to 
prescribing, as such. But let us abstract from these, and 
focus on the respects listed above, in which prescribing does 
indeed instantiate the kind of activity RoL requirements 
apply to. When we see things in this light, a particular 
version of the RoL emerges, comprising the conditions 
which a certain form of guidance of human behaviour has to 
satisfy, if it has to succeed; comprising, i.e., what is in fact 
involved in a particular method of social control which 
consists primarily in the issuing of prescriptions, that is, of 
directives communicated to persons, who are then expected 
to understand and to conform to these directives
18
. This 
includes, of course, orders backed by threats; it is not, 
however, limited to these. It encompasses (with some 
qualifications, to be spelt out along the way) all cases of 
telling somebody what she should do
19
. Henceforth, I shall 
 
 
17  WALDRON (2007, 109-10) rightly observes that L.L. Fuller’s 
treatment of the subject in FULLER 1969, ch. 2, “illustrates a strong 
(…) tendency to associate the rule of law with formal features of 
legislation, as opposed to other modes of law and law-making”. 
18  I am here paraphrasing HART (1961, 202, speaking of “any 
method of social control” consisting primarily of “general standards of 
conduct” addressed to “classes of persons”).  
19  Two qualifications. (1) In order to make room for power-
conferring rules (and, especially, for ules conferring to private 
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call this version of the RoL ‘Enlightenment RoL’ (ERoL), 
due to its embodying some more or less utopian, eminently 
rationalistic (see below) and, perhaps, simplistic desiderata. 
ERoL gives pride of place, in law’s development and 
operation, to legislation. 
A few comments about the role of legislation in ERoL 
are in order. (1) Some conceptions of the RoL celebrate it as 
a spontaneous, non-manufactured, unintended, gradually 
evolving order of human interaction whose administration 
and piecemeal development is entrusted to the collective, 
‘artificial’ reason of the judiciary. But, as J. Waldron notes, 
such views forget “the rule of law difficulties of the 
Common Law – its opacity, the ad hoc character of its 
development, its impredictability, its inherent retro-
activity”
20
. There is no need for us, here, to adjudicate this 
controversy. It is enough that we establish the credentials of 
a ‘legislative’ version of the RoL. 
(2) The notion of a legislation-oriented RoL – ERoL – runs 
counter the well-established contrast between the RoL and 
‘the rule of men’. But this is a mythical contrast
21
. 
 
 
individuals the power to achieve some ends of theirs: ‘If you wish to 
do this, this is the way to do it’, HART 1961, 28), this phrase, as I use 
it here and in what follows, should be understood as including cases 
of telling people how to pursue the goals they want to achieve (or 
telling people how to do what they want to do). (Cf. RAZ 197, 215: 
“power-conferring rules are designed to guide behaviour”.) ‘Prescri-
bing’, so understood, covers both the issuing of mandatory directives, 
and the issuing of power-conferring rules. (2) ‘Telling’ people what 
they should do, as I mean it here, refers to cases of issuing prescri-
ptions, not to ‘detached’ statements of what the addressee should do 
according to a given set of prescriptions (RAZ 1979, 153-7). 
20  WALDRON 2007, 95; cf. also BOBBIO 1961, 91-6.  
21  Cf. RAZ 1977, 212; BOBBIO 1983; MARMOR 2004, 2-3; WALDRON 
2007, 101-4. 
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Traditionally, formal and procedural or institutional aspects 
of the RoL have played a central role in the ideal; and “in 
both cases, the importance of these features in the rule of 
law tradition belies any claim that legislation is incompa-
tible with or repugnant to the rule of law”
22
.  
I do not mean to rule out the possibility of giving a 
definite meaning to the ‘Rule of Law’ vs. ‘rule of men’ 
antithesis. So, e.g., a non-mythical way of understanding the 
contrast might be the one suggested by F. Schauer (2003, 
276). Generalizations – thus, treating unlike cases alike –, 
Schauer notes, are ubiquitous in legal practice (witness 
decision-making by rules, reliance on precedent, and the 
practice of giving reasons). And, Schauer argues 
 
“when the ‘rule of law’ is contrasted with the ‘rule of men’, the core 
idea is that individual power, creativity, initiative and discretion 
have their dark side. The rule of men would be fine if all men were 
good, but when many men are not so, and when a degree of risk-
aversion is justified, we may often prefer to lose the most positive 
efforts of the best of men in order to guard against the most negative 
efforts of the worst of them. (…) [L]aw may be the institution 
charged with checking the worst of abuses even if in doing so it 
becomes less able to make the best of changes” (ibid.). 
 
And, we may add, there is such a thing as limited (consti-
tutional) government. or ‘government under the law’. But, 
 
 
22  WALDRON 2007, 104. Cf. also ibid., 105: “traditional rule of law 
theorists” (e.g., FULLER) have emphasized “procedural requirements, like 
due process in legislation and the separation of powers, and formal require-
ments, like generality, publicity, prospectivity, constancy and so on”; 
“these standards implicitly acknowledge that law is an instrument wielded 
by men; the traditional view concedes that men rule; it just insists that their 
rule be subject to the formal and procedural constraints of legality”. 
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unless by ‘law’ we mean, here, natural law, room has to be 
made, in these ways of understanding the traditional 
antithesis, for the idea that it is men that make the laws. So, 
when men rule ‘under the law’, it is man-made law that the 
government rules under. And, in fact, Schauer’s under-
standing of the traditional antithesis implies that the rules 
and generalizations constraining the discretion of individual 
officials are themselves made by men. So understood, the 
contrast is about the allocation of decisional power, i.e., the 
desirability, as regards certain classes of decisions to be 
made by certain classes of decision-makers, of decision-
making on the basis of entrenched generalizations (them-
selves framed, it is assumed, by other human decision-
makers), or of “rule-based particularism”, rather than (pure-
ly) particularistic decision-making (SCHAUER 1991, ch. 7). 
Taken literally, I think, there is no such a thing as ‘the rule 
of laws, not men’
23
. 
(3) There may be various, more or less weighty ethico-
political reasons for endorsing, as an ideal, a conception of the 
RoL which – just like ERoL – emphasizes the role of legisla-
tion in law’s development and operation
24
. Its connection with 
liberal neutrality (below, 4) is only one of these.  
(4) In focusing on the activity of prescribing, and on 
prescriptive relationships, considered in themselves, I am 
abstracting from the complex, articulated procedural and 
institutional aspects of legislation proper, as it occurs in 
 
 
23  Or, alternatively, all legal systems are cases of the ‘rule of laws, not 
men’ (KELSEN 1945, 36; cf. CELANO 2000; and see also RAZ 1977, 212). 
24  See e.g. WALDRON 2007, 99-100 (“in general, legislation has the 
characteristic that it gives ordinary people a stake in the rule of law, 
by involving them directly or indirectly in its enactment, and by doing 
so in terms of fair political equality”, ibid., 100). What Waldron has in 
mind, here, clearly is democratic legislation. 
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developed legal systems. These, too, may be interpreted as 
instantiating the RoL, or as dictated by RoL considera-
tions
25
, but I shall not follow this path here. Prescribing is 
legislation at its minimum, so to speak. True, issuing pre-
scriptions may also be the instrument of ad hoc decisions. 
The aspects of prescribing I shall focus on, and which 
constitute its distinctive sort of neutrality, however, are not 
peculiar to the ad hoc issuing of decrees. 
So, I assume that the very simple fact of someone trying 
to make someone else do something by telling him to do it 
(and the relationship that comes into being as a consequence 
of this fact) is a suitable model for understanding what goes 
on in legislation proper (although it certainly does not give 
us an exhaustive picture of it). This is by no means obvious, 
or undisputed. Under many respects, the activity of a 
legislature in a modern democracy cannot be assimilated to 
that simple model (cf. e.g. WALDRON 1999, Part I). But I 
shall not try to defend this assumption here.  
 
 
4.  What is neutral about the Rule of Law? 
 
Laws meeting RoL requirements may have almost any 
content. But, I suggest, what is peculiar, as regards the RoL, 
is the form that the exercise of power takes. The RoL is, in 
the first instance, a specific mode of the exercise of power 
by men over men.  
It is certainly not unusual to characterize the RoL as “a 
particular mode of the exercise of political power”. When it is 
so characterized, the RoL, understood as “governance through 
law”, is usually contrasted with “managerial governance or 
 
 
25  Cf. WALDRON 2007, 107. 
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rule by decree”
26
. Or it is contrasted with ‘arbitrary’ power, 
meaning by this public power wielded in the pursuit of private 
interests (RAZ 1977, 219-20). These contrasts are not 
mistaken, of course. But, I suggest, in order to understand 
what is peculiar to the RoL (and to ERoL), and to see what is 
neutral about it, we have to widen the scope of the 
comparison. We have to contrast the RoL (specifically, 
ERoL) with other modes of the exercise of power over human 
beings – modes that are by no means anomalous, rare or 
bizarre, but often go unnoticed in these debates
27
. Power 
exercised by telling people to behave in the desired ways – 
thus, power exercised by issuing laws meeting ERoL 
requirements – has to be distinguished from power exercised 
through different means, or through linguistic means used 
differently. Thus, it has to be distinguished from symbolic, 
charismatic, and pastoral
28
 power; from power exercised 
through manipulation, indoctrination, propaganda, or various 
forms of deceit (such as, e.g., power exercised through lying, 
or by modifying, unknown to the agent, the options that are 
available to him); and, finally, from persecution, disciplinary 
power (pouvoir disciplinaire; FOUCAULT 1975 159-227), 
mute punishment, and sheer physical interference. What 
distinguishes it from these forms of power is the combination 
of two features: (1) it is rational; (2) it is public, transparent, 
out in the open. Let me explain. 
When the government treats its subjects in accordance 
with the ERoL, it treats them as adults, capable of making 
their own decisions on the basis of their own preferences 
 
 
26  The quoted phrases are taken from Waldron 2008a, 78. 
27  But cf. Raz’s discussion of “enslavement” and “manipulation” in 
RAZ 1977, 221; and A. MARMOR’s (2004, 15-6) discussion of 
“subliminal advertising”. 
28  On “pastoral” power cf. FOUCAULT 1981. 
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and their own understanding of the relevant facts. It tells 
them explicitly ‘I want you to behave in such and such a 
way; these will be the consequences – I shall inflict you 
such and such a harm – in case you don’t; now it’s up to 
you’. Let us contrast this mode of exercising power over a 
human being with the way in which children are often 
treated. In order to make children do what we want them to 
do we sometimes tell them lies (‘Candy shops are closed 
now’); we fake non-existing unpleasant consequences (‘The 
wolf will come and get you’); in various ways, we distort 
reality. Or we try unknown to them directly to manipulate 
the environment, or their preferences, by working behind 
their back, so to speak. Or, again, we rely, in trying to make 
them do what we want them to do, on an aura of parental 
authority, or on symbols. In acting in these ways, we do not 
recognize children the dignity of responsible agents, capable 
of autonomous choice; we do not treat them as autonomous 
agents capable of – and entitled to – making their own 
choices on the basis of preferences and beliefs which are in 
fact their own (on the basis, thus, of their awareness of the 
way things in fact are, or of the way they see things, rather 
than on the basis of a mistaken understanding of reality, that 
we have induced on purpose)
 29
. 
Let us try to spell out what is involved in this contrast. 
We are considering a simple situation: X issues a 
prescription addressed to Y – for instance, X orders Y to do 
something, and his order is backed by the threat of visiting 
her with an evil in case of non-compliance. The latter is 
what HART (1961) famously referred to as ‘the gunman 
situation’. In what follows, I shall use this label, because I 
 
 
29  What matters. here, is not that their preferences and beliefs are not 
the upshot of some form of conditioning or other disreputable process. 
It is, first and foremost, that we are not the authors of these processes. 
Bruno Celano 
 
575 
think it is important to stress, in the present context, that it is 
also this kind of situation that I am focusing on. But it 
should be remembered throughout that the gunman situation 
is only one among different kinds of prescriptive relation-
ships. What I am interested in is, generally (albeit with some 
qualifications), the mode of power exercised in trying to 
make somebody do something by telling her to do it.  
The gunman situation has two basic features: it relies on 
the rational agency of the parties, and it is fully public. (I 
stress that these are features that prescriptions typically 
exhibit, and defeasible presumptions. Non-standard 
prescriptions are possible, of course). 
 
(1) Rationality. In the gunman situation, appearances no-
twithstanding, rationality is pervasive. The gunman situation 
is, conspicuously, a form of rational interaction – i.e., a 
kind of situation an adequate description of which is pre-
mised on the assumption that the parties involved possess, 
and are capable of exercising, distinctively rational abilities, 
and that their attitudes, choices and actions meet standards 
of minimal rationality (Celano 2002, 2.1). True, in the 
gunman situation X exerts a kind of causal influence over 
Y. But, contrary to what happens in cases, e.g., of sheer 
physical force, or of straightforward manipulation of the 
agent’s preferences, or of symbolic influence, the influence 
being exerted on the subject’s behaviour is mediated by 
(thus, it depends on, and requires) the exercise, on the part 
of the individual whose behaviour is being affected, of a 
varied set of complex rational skills and abilities. 
(a) The individual whose behaviour is affected by the 
gunman’s order is presumed by the gunman to be a rational 
agent. ‘Rationality’, here, designates in the first instance the 
ability to understand the utterance of a sentence, to grasp its 
meaning and force. The act of issuing an order backed by a 
threat is a communicative linguistic act: the order is a 
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message addressed to somebody of whom it is assumed that 
he is able to understand a message, and to act in one or the 
other of two alternative ways on the basis of this under-
standing. (This is why it is usually assumed – a plausible 
assumption – that it would make no sense to address an 
order backed by a threat to a stone, a colour, or a number).  
The gunman situation is, thus, a situation whose descripti-
on (when adequate) entails that the individual whose 
behaviour is affected is endowed with highly developed com-
municative competences – specifically, linguistic competence. 
The relevant competence includes the mastery of – i.e., the 
ability to grasp and to apply correctly – concepts. 
Moreover, an order backed by a threat is issued, typically, 
with a certain intention, and its workings rest on a complex set 
of interrelated intentions, and their successful expression and 
detection (GRICE 1957; STRAWSON 1964, 256-7; SCHIFFER 
1972, p. 19; CELANO 1990, 127-51, 205-13; cf. also RAZ 1996, 
283). Typically, the lawgiver has, first, the intention to make the 
addressee perform a certain action; and, second, he intends to 
make the addressee perform a certain action as a consequence 
of his uttering a sentence. Third, he intends to make the 
addressee perform a certain action (as a consequence of his 
uttering a sentence) by virtue of the recognition, by the 
addressee, of these very same intentions. It is not enough, for a 
prescription to come into existence, that the aim of the lawgiver 
be that the addressee act the way he desires, and that this should 
happen as a consequence of his uttering a sentence. It is 
necessary, further, “that the speaker should intend the person 
addressed to recognize that this is his purpose in speaking”
30
, 
and to recognize this intention. In issuing a prescription the 
 
 
30  HART 1961, 235; cf. also ID. 1982, 250-2. This is the set of 
intentions constitutive of what H.P. GRICE (1957) has called “non-
natural meaning”.  
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lawgiver assumes his addressee to be capable of detecting – and 
of expressing her detection of – a complex set of nested inten-
tions. The addressee is presumed to be capable of under-
standing (i) that the speaker wants her to behave in a certain 
way; (ii) that he wants to make her behave in the desired way; 
(iii) that he wants to produce this outcome as a consequence of 
his uttering a sentence; (iv) that he wants to produce this 
outcome by virtue of her recognition of this whole set of 
intentions, (i) to (iv). Thus, for a prescription to affect its 
addressee’s conduct in the way it is intended to, it is necessary 
that the addressee understand that her understanding of the 
prescription – this very understanding – is a necessary condition 
for it to produce the desired outcome. 
So, in claiming that the gunman situation is a case of 
rational interaction, what I mean by ‘rationality’ is, first, an 
individual’s ability to understand a non-naturally meaning-
ful message addressed to her – an ability which, in turn, 
involves the mastery of concepts, and the ability to have, to 
recognize and to express the recognition of complex 
intentional structures of the required sort. As a consequence, 
the influence exerted by the lawgiver on the addressee may 
be said to be a kind of ‘causal-cum-rational’ influence: in 
order for the addressee’s conduct to be affected in the 
desired way, she has to understand that it is being affected 
in this way, and what this way consists in. A prescription is 
a kind of tool that works (in the way it is intended to work) 
only if the object it causally affects understands that it is so 
working. Under this respect, it is a kind of tool very dif-
ferent from tools whose operation relies on physical proces-
ses only. (Imagine a hammer which works in pinning down 
nails only if the nail understands (i) that it is being pinned 
down, and (ii) the physical laws according to which the 
hammer’s blows cause its being progressively pinned 
down.) The addressee’s understanding of the process 
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leading her to act in the relevant way is a necessary step in 
this very same process. 
(b) But how can understanding an utterance of the 
relevant sort lead an individual to act in a given way rather 
than another? 
X orders Y to perform action A, and he threatens her 
with the infliction of a sanction – something unpleasant – in 
case Y does not comply. If Y understands the order (and the 
annexed threat), and if X is in fact capable of, and is willing 
to (or, if Y believes he is)
31
 visit her with the threatened evil 
in case of non-compliance, it may happen that Y decides, on 
the basis of her understanding of the order, and of her desire 
to avoid the unpleasant consequence X has threatened, to do 
what X ordered her to do. This illustrates a further sense in 
which the influence a prescription produces on its addres-
see’s conduct may be said to be a form of ‘causal-cum-
rational’ influence. The influence which is being exerted on 
the addressee’s behaviour depends on, and is grounded in, a 
piece of reasoning – drawing the conclusion of an inference 
– on the addressee’s part (e.g., ‘Unless I do A, I shall incur 
in S; I do not wish to incur in S; thus, I ought to do A’)
32
. 
Orders backed by threats, thus, ‘work’ – i.e., they 
manage to produce their intended outcomes – by relying on 
their addressees’ ability to perform practical inferences, and 
to act according to the latter’s conclusions. A prescription’s 
characteristic mode of operation is, in short, mediated by its 
addressee engaging in a piece of practical reasoning
33
. 
 
 
31  I shall leave this complication aside here.  
32  On this variety of practical inferences cf. VON WRIGHT 1962. This 
is only one among many possible forms, of course.  
33  Specifically, orders backed by threats ‘work’ (when they do work) 
by altering the addressees’ preference ordering. A given option (e.g., 
giving one’s purse to a stranger) – an option the agent, if rational, would 
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Let us take stock. A prescription is addressed to an 
individual of whom it is assumed that she can understand the 
utterance of a sentence, and is, further, capable of deciding, 
on the basis of this understanding, to act in a certain way 
rather than another – is, i.e., capable of making choices on the 
basis of the weighing of reasons for and against compliance. 
The kind of – causal – influence a prescription is meant to 
exert on an individual, thus, may be said to be a kind of 
rational influence in so far as the working of a prescription – 
Y’s conduct being affected by X’s uttering a sentence – (1) is 
premised on Y’s (and, of course, X’s) ability to speak a 
 
 
not have chosen, given his current preference ordering, had the order not 
been issued – becomes, by virtue of the order, and the associated threat, 
the preferred one, so that (on a simple maximizing conception of 
practical rationality) choosing it is, now, rationally mandated (i.e., it has 
now become what a rational agent, given his newly shaped preference 
ordering, should do). Behaviour in accordance with the order is the 
object of a choice; this choice is, in turn, the outcome of a piece of 
practical reasoning. The order does indeed affect the preference ordering 
of its addressee; it does so, however, in a peculiar way, very different 
from the one involved in manipulating the agent’s preferences by acting 
‘behind his back’-e.g., by pouring, unknown to him, a drug in his tea, or 
through brainwashing. In the latter cases, X operates ‘behind Y’s back’ 
in the following sense: X produces the desired outcome – making a 
given option Y’s preferred one (thus, altering Y’s preference ordering) – 
by exerting a purely causal influence. Typically, the agent will remain 
unaware of the way in which her preference ordering has been modified. 
In the case of an order backed by a threat, on the contrary, the agent is 
made to face a choice. Her being aware of the mechanism through which 
X tries to make her behave in a certain way, her taking this mechanism’s 
workings into account, is part and parcel of its very same workings. An 
order backed by a threat is a device, which works only if the individual 
on which it exerts its influence understands that, ad how, it is exerting its 
influence. When an order backed by a threat has success, its addressee 
chooses, decides to comply (coactus tamen voluit). 
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language – thus, on their mastering concepts, and their ability 
to form, express, and detect complex intentional structures of 
a Gricean sort; (2) is grounded in Y’s – and X’s – performing 
the relevant pieces of practical reasoning – and, crucially, on 
X’s anticipating Y’s practical reasoning (including Y’s 
representation, in her practical reasoning, of X’s practical 
reasoning, and of this very anticipation); and (3) under both 
respects, it relies on Y’s understanding of this working itself. 
It is in virtue of these features that, I think, the gunman 
situation may be characterized as a form of rational 
interaction – a kind of situation an adequate description of 
which entails, or presupposes, that the parties involved be 
endowed with rationality
34
.  
 
(2)  Common knowledge. The mode of power we are 
discussing is a kind of power whose exercise takes place out 
in the open between lawgiver and prescription-addressee. 
In order for the lawgiver to achieve his aim, it is 
necessary for him to make his intention – the intention of 
making the addressee perform a certain action through the 
utterance of a given sentence – known to the addressee. This 
is not, however, sufficient for his utterance to count as a 
prescription. If odd or deviant ways of influencing others’ 
behaviour through linguistic means have to be ruled out 
(STRAWSON 1964, 256-7, 263; SCHIFFER 1972, p. 30), a 
condition of common knowledge has to be satisfied. In 
 
 
34  J. Austin was well aware of this; see AUSTIN 1832, at 18, 20; this 
is also Bentham’s view (see HART 1982, 244, 251). Cf. also RAZ 
1977, 222: “a legal system which does in general observe the rule of 
law (…) attempts to guide [people’s] behaviour through affecting the 
circumstances of their action. It thus presupposes that they are rational 
(…) creatures and attempts to affect their actions and habits by 
affecting their deliberations”. 
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prescribing, the lawgiver intends to make the addressee 
perform a given action by virtue of the recognition, by the 
addressee herself, of this very same intention (cf. above). 
Thus, an utterance may count as a prescription only if the 
addressee believes that the lawgiver has the relevant 
intentional structure, if she believes the lawgiver to believe 
that she believes he has it, and so on. Likewise, it is 
necessary that the lawgiver believes that the addressee 
recognizes this structure, he believes her to believe that he 
believes this, and so on. In short, a prescription only has 
been issued – and a prescriptive relationship between X and 
Y only comes into existence – if a suitable system of 
interlocking mutual beliefs comes into place: only if it is 
common (or mutual) knowledge between lawgiver and 
addressee that it has been issued
35
.  
By the way: this, I suggest, is how we should understand 
– at the level of the community as a whole – what is 
involved in the RoL requirement of publicity. When it is 
required that laws should be public, what is meant by this is 
not only that each one of the addressees should know what 
the law is, but also that everybody should know that 
everybody knows… (and so on, up through a chain of 
suitable mutual beliefs) what the law is
36
. (Think of a 
regime in which a law is made known to its addressees by 
sending each one of them a sealed envelope. Everybody 
knows what the law is. But, would in this case the RoL 
requirement of publicity be met?) Legislation – i.e., the 
 
 
35  On the notion of common or mutual knowledge see respectively 
Lewis 1969, 52 ff.; SCHIFFER 1972, 30 ff. 
36  So understood, the RoL condition of publicity corresponds to 
Rawls’ first level of publicity of the principles of justice in a well-
ordered society (cf. e.g. RAWLS 1999, 292-3, 324; thanks to José Juan 
Moreso and Jahel Queralt for reminding this to me). 
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issuing of prescriptions – egregiously qualifies as a way of 
meeting this requirement. 
Thus, the mode of power exercised in trying to make 
somebody do something by telling her to do it has two basic 
features: it relies on the rational agency of the parties, and it 
is fully public. When power is exercised in this way – thus, 
when ERoL requirements are satisfied – I suggest, a kind of 
neutrality is achieved. Lawgiving neutralizes some of the 
differences between lawgiver and addressee, levelling, in a 
sense, their respective positions. By this I mean two things. 
 
(1)  In a prescriptive relationship, lawgiver and addressee 
are put in a position of reciprocity: they interact as rational 
agents, in the light of an appropriate set of mutual beliefs 
concerning, inter alia, their status as rational agents. I.e., 
they presume each other to be endowed with the relevant 
rational abilities. To this – limited, of course – extent, their 
respective positions are levelled. They face each other as 
equally engaged in communicating with each other.. 
(2) In a prescriptive relationship, the subject to whom the 
relevant prescription is addressed is lept at a distance, so to 
speak. She is not regarded by the lawgiver as an appendix 
to, or an extension of, his own body, as merely a tool, or as 
one commodity among others at his disposal, or again as 
something in the environment to be manipulated. Causal 
efficacy on her conduct is mediated by her own 
understanding of its being exerted, and how – and this is 
common knowledge between the two. 
 
All this may look overstated. Orders backed by threats are 
sometimes brutal. They may be addressed by a master to his 
slave. The operation of requests may rest on sweeping forces 
and all too powerful incentives, such as, e.g., life, or parental 
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love, or the implicit threat of their withdrawal. (Some ‘offers’ 
simply ‘cannot be refused’
37
.) The two features I have listed, 
however, concern the form, or structure, of the relationship (at 
least when conditions are satisfied, designed to rule out 
‘offers that cannot be refused’)
38
. When we contrast the 
issuing of a prescription with recourse to sheer physical force, 
or to silent manipulation of the subject’s environment, I think 
we can see this twofold difference
39
. Under both respects, I 
think, one distinctive feature of prescriptive relationships is 
that rulers regard their subjects, literally, as addressees – i.e., 
as subjects capable (and worthy; see below) of being addres-
sed. To borrow a phrase from Strawson, their dealings with 
them, as addressees, are not premised on “objectivity of 
attitude”: a “purely objective view of the agent as one posing 
problems simply of intellectual understanding, management, 
treatment and control”
40
. 
 
 
37  Thanks to José Juan Moreso fo reminding me this point. 
38  Think, for a related case, of threats having a ‘Your money or your 
life’ structure. These do not exemplify the structure described in the 
text: they do not offer the subject a choice. In case the subject 
complies, the gunman will get her money. In case she doesn’t, the 
gunmen will get both her life and her money. This is, in fact, no (well-
formed) alternative. The latter hypothesis includes the former – they 
are not logically independent.  
39  Doesn’t charismatic power, too, work by telling people what to 
do? Not in the way described here. Charismatic power does not, by 
hypothesis, offer the subject a choice – it does not rely on the 
subject’s weighing reasons for and against doing what the leader 
wants her to do. Rather, it works by virtue of some sort of magnetism 
(however this may then be explained) a person exerts on another 
person – and this is, precisely, why the former may properly be said to 
be the ‘leader’, rather than a lawgiver. 
40  STRAWSON 1962, 87. “To adopt the objective attitude to another 
human being is to see him, perhaps, as an object of social policy; as a 
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Lawgiving, thus, in a sense neutralizes asymmetries 
between lawgiver and addressee, levelling their positions. 
But, does this kind of ‘neutralization’ have anything to do 
with liberal neutrality? 
The RoL is one political ideal among many (I mean 
other respectable ideals: democracy, justice, equality, 
human rights, and so on), and it should not be confused with 
any one of them (RAZ 1977, 211). It is, in fact, a modest 
ideal. Not in the sense that it is easily attainable, but in the 
sense that it is compatible with gross injustice, and in 
general with gross violations of other ideals. Specifically, 
neither the RoL as such, nor ERoL, guarantee liberal 
neutrality. It may well happen that laws satisfying the RoL – 
or ERoL – requirements enact and enforce one religious 
view, or one particular conception of the good among many. 
As far as their content is concerned, laws meeting RoL 
conditions need not be neutral. But, when we consider the 
RoL – and, specifically, ERoL – as a peculiar mode of the 
exercise of power, we see that there is something neutral 
about it. And that, under the relevant respects, it has indeed 
something to do with liberal neutrality: it does in fact 
instantiate part of what is involved in the idea of liberal 
neutrality. Let us see why. 
One of the main grounds for the rejection of state 
perfectionism in favour of liberal neutrality is the idea that 
 
 
subject for what, in a wide range of sense, might be called treatment; as 
something certainly to be taken account, perhaps precautionary account, 
of; to be managed or handled or cured or trained” (ibid., 79). Strawson 
writes that “if your attitude towards someone is wholly objective, then 
though you may fight him, you cannot quarrel with him, and though you 
may talk to him, even negotiate with him, you cannot reason with him” 
(ibid.). But this, it seems to me, downplays what is involved, by way of 
reasoning with someone, in talking to him. 
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state policies should respect the “endorsement constraint”: 
in W. Kymlicka’s words, “my life only goes better if I am 
leading it from the inside, according to my beliefs about 
value” (KYMLICKA 2002, 216; cf. also ID., 1989a, 10-9; 
DWORKIN 1989, 217). Perfectionist politics tends to be 
paternalistic, in the sense of violating the endorsement 
constraint. And – here’s my point – the kind of communi-
cative attitude involved in lawgiving – in issuing prescripti-
ons – is a constitutive, necessary component of respect for 
the endorsement constraint
41
.  
 
 
41  As KYMLICKA notes (2002, 277), the endorsement constraint rules 
out “coercive and manipulative forms of perfectionism”. True, 
prescriptions may be the instrument of coercion – coercion is the 
whole point of the gunman situation. But, I think, the kind of coercion 
exerted by an order backed by threats (when it satisfies the conditions 
hinted at below, n. 45) is very different, under the relevant respect, 
from the other forms of coercion and forms of manipulation listed in 
the text above, in this section. True, paternalistic interventions may 
aim at converting people, making them sincerely endorse the desired 
way of life; this aim may be achieved through mechanisms that lessen 
the person’s “ability to consider the critical merits of the change in a 
reflective way”; endorsement brought about in this way, though 
sincere, should not count as “genuine”; and, finally, “threats of 
criminal punishment corrupt rather than enhance critical judgment” 
(DWORKIN 1989, 218). So we may want to rule out, on liberal – 
specifically, anti-paternalistic grounds – the enforcement of a 
preferred way of life through the criminal law. To repeat, the kind of 
‘neutrality’ involved in ERoL is not, by itself, liberal neutrality. But. it 
seems to me, the required “conditions and circumstances of genuine 
endorsement” have to be moulded so as to distinguish neatly between 
paternalism that can “justify itself by adding chemical or electrical 
brainwashing to its regime” (ibid.) and paternalism that brings about 
endorsement, though not genuine, through the issuing of prescriptions 
(granted that these, too, may corrupt our critical judgment).  
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When the government treats its subjects in accordance 
with the ERoL, it treats them as rational agents, capable of 
(1) mastering concepts, and detecting, grasping, forming, 
expressing and generally finding their way in complex 
structures of communicative intentions; (2) making their 
own decisions on the basis of their own preferences and 
their own view of the relevant facts. By treating them in this 
way, government recognizes them the dignity of beings 
worthy of being publicly, openly addressed, and of being 
guided through their understanding of the way in which 
power is being exerted on them.  
So, when treating its subjects in accordance with ERoL 
requirements government recognizes people the dignity of 
responsible agents, capable of autonomous choice; it 
addresses them openly, and tries to guide their behaviour 
through their very understanding of what it is trying to do, 
and how. In short, it treats them with, and shows them, 
respect. (Recall the contrast with manipulation, 
indoctrination. propaganda, deceit, persecution, discipline, 
mute punishment.) This way of exercising power, I said, is 
very different from the way in which people sometimes try 
to guide children’s behaviour – distorting reality, or trying 
to manipulate the environment or their preferences, by 
working behind their back; relying on the efficacy of 
symbols or charisma. These, of course, are ways in which 
even adult men and women are often treated – and 
sometimes wish to be treated (or have to be treated). But 
they are not, I submit, respectful ways
42
. 
 
 
42  Remember that we are dealing, here, with standard cases (above, n. 
16). Abuses are possible. So, for instance, one interesting way of 
acquiring and exercising power over human beings is by inducing in 
them strong feelings of guilt, or the sense of their constitutive 
insufficiency, or weakness – and setting ourselves as their healers (either 
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Treating each individual with respect – treating her non-
paternalistically, as a responsible agent – is an essential 
component in liberal neutrality. By an ‘essential component’ 
I mean, here, two things: that, for liberals, state neutrality 
entails treating each individual with equal respect; and that, 
for liberals, treating individuals with equal respect is the 
main ground – and spring – for endorsing state neutrality
43
. 
Thus, to the extent that they involve respect for individuals, 
ERoL requirements instantiate part of what is involved in 
liberal neutrality. This is not, of course, being neutral 
between different conceptions of the good; nor is it not 
taking sides between different individuals or groups in 
society. It is not even something distinctive of liberalism as 
such (DWORKIN 1978a, 187). It is however, in a sense, 
treating individuals with equal respect. Individuals are, to 
the extent that they are all addressed as the addressees of 
prescriptions, treated with equal respect
44
. (Remember that 
 
 
because we are uniquely authorized to guarantee them forgiving for their 
faults, or because we know how, and are able to, supplement them in 
their weakness). One way of doing this is by issuing prescriptions we 
know they will not be able to comply with – setting a standard we (and 
they) know they will not be capable of living up to. I.e., by flouting the 
requirement that whoever prescribes wants the addressee to do what he 
prescribes her to do (see above, n. 16), and tries, by issuing a 
prescription, to make her perform the desired action. In such cases, we 
do not actually want the addressees do what we (seem to) require from 
them; it is thanks to their (expected) non-compliance that we (mean to) 
acquire power over them. 
43  This point I take, here, as axiomatic. But see, e.g., DWORKIN 
1978a, 191; KYMLICKA 2002, 221 (“liberals say that state neutrality is 
required to respect people’s self-determination”). 
44  This, I think, is the point of Bentham’s criticism of the Common 
Law as “Dog Law” (cf. e.g. BENTHAM 1970, 184, and Postema 1986, 
277). Cf. also RAZ 1977, 221-2; MACCORMICK 1985, 24-7. (Raz’s 
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this concerns the form of the relationship only, not the 
prescription’s content
45
). This is compatible with all sorts of 
 
 
reasons for claiming that “observance of the rule of law is necessary if 
the law is to respect human dignity” are, in fact, different from the one 
given in the text. “Respecting human dignity entails treating humans 
as persons capable of planning and plotting their future”, Raz goes on; 
“thus, respecting people’s dignity entails respecting their autonomy, 
their right to control their future”. And, Raz claims, there are two 
main ways in which disregard for the RoL “violates human dignity”: 
by producing “uncertainty”, and by frustrating expectations the law 
has contributed to encourage. This is not the connection I have tried to 
highlight in the text; Raz’s argument concerns te whole set of RoL 
conditions, and it does not refer, specifically, to the operation of 
prescriptions – to ERoL. It seems to me, however, that Raz’s 
argument, though relating to a further layer of complexity in the idea 
of the RoL – ‘further’ with respect to the one considered in the text – 
implies the latter, and implicitly builds on it. “A legal system which 
does in general observe the rule of law – Raz claims – treats people as 
persons at least in the sense that it attempts to guide their behaviour 
through affecting the circumstances of their action. It thus 
presupposes that they are rational autonomous creatures and attempts 
to affect their actions and habits by affecting their deliberations”, 
ibid., 222. The law’s frustrating expectations it has contributed to 
encourage is “often (…) analogous to entrapment”; in so doing the 
law expresses “disrespect” for its subjects.)  
45  There is, however, a continuum ranging from, at one extreme, 
prescriptions as a vehicle of respect for their addressees and, at the 
other extreme, prescriptions wielded as weapons by people intending 
only to make other people do certain things – or positively aiming at 
humiliating them. Orders may be barked at night by armed guards to 
deprived, terrorized people at their arrival at the concentration camp, 
so as to make them reach as soon as possible their barracks, or the gas 
chamber. If prescriptions are to work as vehicles of respect, such cases 
have to be ruled out, by imposing additional conditions. One such 
condition is, I think, that meaningful options should be open to the 
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disrespect and unjust discrimination, of course. But it 
positively is, it seems to me, part of what is involved in the 
liberal ideal of neutrality
46
. 
 
 
5.  Liberal multiculturalism, human rights, and the rule of 
law 
 
So, the RoL – the RoL as a form, and as specified by ERoL 
principles – instantiates part of what is involved in liberal 
neutrality. This is the conclusion of my first argument. I 
 
 
addressee in case he acts as he is ordered to. (On the other hand, I 
have already hinted at a condition ruling out ‘offers that cannot be 
refused’; more generally, meaningful options have to be open in case 
of non-compliance.) Or, again, we should allow for the possibility 
that, in some circumstances, treating somebody as the addressee of a 
prescription (thus implying that he enjoys the dignity of a rational 
being) may be a peculiarly effective way of shaming him (thanks to 
Nicola Muffato for this point). It should also be noted that the 
utterance of sentences in the imperative mood – or, generally, 
sentences standardly used for issuing prescriptions – may simply 
trigger a conditioned reflex, or work through symbolic properties. 
Prescriptions, as discussed in the text (and as envisaged in ERoL) as 
the prime instrument of government, are an ideal communicative type. 
46  But, it will be objected, cannot perfectionist politics (or a non-
liberal politics of the common good) be pursued through the issuing of 
prescriptions? In principle, yes. As I said, ERoL does not guarantee 
liberal neutrality (and cf. above, n. 41.) And yet, we associate – 
rightly, I think – perfectionist purposes with resort to other modes of 
power, such as, e.g., taking care that individuals live in a morally 
healthy environment (thus, gerrymandering the set of options 
available to them), or indoctrination. From a perfectionist perspective, 
it is not easy to resist taking, vis-à-vis subjects, the stance of a good 
shepherd. (This is not a necessary, conceptual connection; it is, 
however, a very material psychological one.) 
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shall now investigate the connections between LM, state 
neutrality, and the RoL. 
LM is a position associated with the name of W. 
Kymlicka. By the term ‘multiculturalism’ I mean, following 
KYMLICKA (2007, 16; cf. also 2002, 335) “a wide range of 
policies designed to provide some level of public reco-
gnition, support or accommodation to non-dominant cultural 
groups”, such as immigrants or refugees, national minorities 
and indigenous peoples. LM, in turn, is a brand of political 
theory, and related policies, in which “multiculturalism is 
understood as a concept that is both guided and constrained 
by a foundational commitment to principles of individual 
freedom and equality” (2007, 7; cf. also ibid., 61).  
My first premise concerns LM and human rights. I can 
be brief about this, since the relevant connection is 
explicitly laid out and repeatedly emphasized by Kymlicka 
himself. In short, human rights are a necessary condition for 
LM; that is, the recognition and the – more or less effective 
– protection of human rights is (in ideal compliance theory) 
a necessary condition for meaningful liberal policies of 
recognition and accommodation of ethnocultural minorities, 
or for liberal rights securing for individuals the good of 
cultural membership. 
In LM (as it has developed during the last forty years or 
so in the established Western democracies), KYMLICKA 
claims, human rights play a “dual role”, as “inspiration” and 
as “constraint” (2007, 96). On the one hand, “the trend 
towards liberal multiculturalism can only be understood as a 
new stage in the gradual working out of the logic of human 
rights” (ibid., 89). On the other hand, LM policies “operate 
within the constraints of [norms of universal human rights]” 
(ibid., 6)
47
. What is distinctive of LM – what LM “seeks to 
 
 
47  Cf. KYMLICKA 2007, 88: “human rights ideals have not only 
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do” – is “to filter and to frame [group-differentiated ethno-
political claims] through the language of human rights, civil 
liberties and democratic accountability” (ibid., 96)
48
. While 
allowing (with limitations) group-differentiated minority 
 
 
helped to inspire and justify claims for multiculturalism, but have 
strongly influenced how these claims are framed, channelling and 
filtering them to accord with the underlying values of international 
human rights norms” (“in […] contemporary struggles [for multi-
culturalism and minority rights] […] minority rights are tightly 
interwoven with human rights ideals”). In the West, LM has emerged 
as “part and parcel of a larger human rights revolution”, ibid., 135: see 
also ibid., at pp. 6, 18, 254. True, human rights are not, by themselves, 
sufficient for ensuring ethnocultural justice (KYMLICKA 2001, 72-82); 
they are, however, necessary for it (ibid., 82). In LM, minority group 
rights are meant to supplement – rather than obliterate – them (ibid., 
70, 81; cf. also KYMLICKA 2002, 340). As a matter of fact, KYMLICKA 
claims (2007, 93), in the established Western democracies, “there is 
no legal space for minorities to set aside human rights norms in the 
name of multiculturalism” (and usually no wish on their part to do so), 
due to “the existence of robust legal mechanisms to protect human 
rights and the existence of a consensus on liberal-democratic values” 
(cf. also ibid., 182: “robust legal mechanisms for protecting human 
rights, and the more general development of a human rights culture”). 
“From a legal point of view, policies of multiculturalism operate 
within the larger framework of liberal constitutionalism” (ibid., 93). 
Thus, “it is legally impossible for minorities in the West to establish 
islands of illiberal rule” (ibid., 94). See also ibid., at pp. 144 (on sub-
state autonomies operating “within the constraints of liberal-demo-
cratic constitutionalism, which firmly upholds individual rights”), 
150-2 (on the more problematic case of indigenous peoples; cf. below, 
6), 161 (on immigrant multiculturalism policies). 
48  On LM as opposed against “traditionalist” approaches to multi-
culturalism – in particular. to the understanding of multiculturalism as 
a “’communitarian’ reaction against liberalisation” (and liberalism) cf. 
KYMLICKA 2007, 99-103. 
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rights and policies which work as “external protections” – 
i.e., protections against the larger majority culture and state 
– for ethnocultural minorities, LM rejects (barring “extreme 
circumstances”) “internal restrictions”, that is, “the demand 
by a minority culture to restrict the basic civil or political 
liberties of its own members”
49
.  
In short, then, LM requires the recognition and the 
guarantee of human rights. My second premise concerns the 
connection between human rights and the Rol. Here, my 
point – but I claim no originality for it – is that conformity 
to the RoL requirements is a necessary condition for 
respecting human rights. 
The connection between human rights and the RoL – 
specifically, the idea of the RoL as the way of protecting 
human rights – is stated in the Preamble, para. 3, to the 
UDHR. Indeed, how could human rights be effectively 
protected and guaranteed, if not by means of the RoL?  
One way of establishing a tight connection between 
human rights and the RoL is DWORKIN’s. In his Political 
Judges and the Rule of Law (1978b) Dworkin puts forward 
a ‘rights conception’ of the RoL. Dworkinian RoL consists 
in “rule by an accurate public conception of individual 
rights” (DWORKIN 1978b, 11-2). The relevant rights are first 
and foremost moral rights; they qualify as legal rights in 
virtue of their being entailed by sound principles of political 
morality (subject, perhaps, to further constraints)
50
. 
 
 
49 Kymlicka 1995, 152; ID., 2002, 342, 352, 356; see also ID., 1989a, 
at 170, 197-9; ID., 1996. This should not be understood only in a 
narrow legalistic sense (KYMLICKA 1999, 32) – though also in a 
legalistic sense. 
50  Cf. WALDRON 2004, 120: “the conception of the rule of law 
defended by Professor Dworkin in Political Judges and the Rule of 
Law is distinguished by its emphasis on moral rights, and by the 
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This is obviously not the path I am following here. 
Dworkin’s conception of the RoL is very different from, and 
much more ambitious than, the formal cum institutional and 
procedural one I have adopted (above, 2). The connection 
between human rights and the RoL, as here understood, is, 
rather, indirect
51
. Conformity to ERoL is a necessary – 
though certainly not a sufficient – condition for the law to 
treat its subjects as responsible agents capable of autono-
mous choice (above, 4) – capable, that is, of rationally 
forming, pursuing and revising their own view of the good 
life, and of forming, adopting, and revising, in accordance 
to this view, their own plan of life. Moreover, part of what is 
involved in this is a certain quality – of fairness, and reci-
procity – of the interaction between rulers and ruled
52
. 
Under both respects, ERoL may reasonably be counted as a 
necessary condition for respect of, and an effective 
protection of, human rights.  
When government treats its subjects in accordance with 
RoL (specifically, ERoL) requirements, in sum, it treats 
them with – and shows them – the respect which, it is assu-
med, is owed to the dignity of rational autonomous agents 
(above, 4). This way of treating someone, I submit, is 
entailed by treating her as the bearer of at least some 
 
 
directness of the link that it seeks to establish between that idea and 
the idea of legality”. 
51  Another way of establishing a connection between fundamental 
rights and the RoL is RAWLS’s (1971, 54-60, 235-43; cf. VIOLA 2004). 
I shall not consider it here. 
52  FINNIS 1980, 272-3; MACCORMICK 1985, 26. According to 
WALDRON (2007, 116) Fuller holds that the point of the “internal 
morality of law” – i.e., the RoL – is “to respect human dignity and 
secure a certain equality or reciprocity between ruler and ruled” (see 
FULLER 1969, 39-40, 162-3).  
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fundamental rights which are usually included in lists of 
human rights
53
. True, laws that meet the requirements of the 
RoL – or of ERoL – may authorize, or even enjoin, viola-
tions of human rights (RAZ 1977, 221). Respect for ERoL, 
however, is a necessary condition for respecting human 
rights. Treating a person as a responsible agent is a precon-
dition for recognizing him as the bearer of some of the 
rights we usually call ‘human rights’. And this way of 
treating people is, as we have seen, what the neutrality of 
ERoL amounts to
54
. 
 
 
6.  Liberal multiculturalism and the rule of law  
 
My conclusion, then, is that the RoL, and the sort of 
neutrality it instantiates, are part and parcel of what is 
involved in LM. Thus, LM entails, via human rights, the 
RoL, and its peculiar brand of neutrality.  
But, it will be objected, this is no surprise. LM is, by 
definition, a variety of liberalism; liberalism entails the 
principle of state neutrality; and, finally, state neutrality 
arguably entails the RoL (or ERoL); thus, trivially LM 
entails both the principle of neutrality, and the RoL. This is, 
however, too simple, and not very illuminating, I think. 
Rather, as I have been at pains to emphasize, ERoL 
 
 
53  I stress that I am not committing the sin of equating conformity to 
the RoL with respecting human rights (RAZ 1977, 211). What I am 
claiming is, rather, that the former is a minimal condition for the latter. 
54  But, it might be asked, is conformity to the RoL, or to ERoL, the 
only way in which government can treat people respectfully, as respon-
sible agents? I have not shown that this is so. I can think, however, of no 
other way. It seems to me that (to the extent at least that we assume that 
government operates through the law) there is none. 
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instantiates, in a peculiar way, part of what is involved in 
liberal neutrality. Thus, the connection between LM, state 
neutrality and the RoL that I have tried to lay out is not a 
straightforward one. LM, I have argued, requires a specific 
kind of neutrality, via the RoL: it requires the specific kind 
of neutrality instantiated by the RoL – specifically, ERoL.  
Armed with this conclusion, we find ourselves facing 
some open – crucial – issues. Among them, e.g., the issue of 
exemptions from human rights norms (and, plausibly, RoL 
requirements) sometimes requested by indigenous peoples, 
or other minorities, in the name of the recognition and 
accommodation of their ethnocultural identity
55
. (Specifical-
ly, the issue of cultural defenses may involve the weakening 
of RoL requirements.) And, more, generally, we find 
ourselves facing the issue of legal pluralism. Legal plura-
lism is one of the main tools of a multicultural politics. But, 
how does it impinge on the RoL
56
? This – that we somehow 
have to face these and other intractable issues – is, indeed, 
no surprise. 
 
 
 
55  Cf., on requested exemptions from Bills of Rights norms, and 
from judicial review by national courts, KYMLICKA 1989a, 170-1, 196-
9; ID. 1995, 168-9, 230; ID., 1996; ID. 2001, 84 ff.; ID., 2002, 343; ID. 
2007, 93, 150-2.  
56  Cf. VIOLA 2007.  
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